Max Planck Institute of Economics

	Dr. Luis G. González Morales
	Research Associate
	Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group Kahlaische Straße 10 D-07745 Jena Germany
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Education:
08.1991 - 12.1995	B.A. in Economics Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Mexico)
08.1996 - 05.1999	M.S. in Applied Statistics Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Mexico)
04.1999 - 12.2002	Ph.D. in Economics Graduate Program "Allocation Theory, Economic Policy and Collective Decisions", Universities of Bochum and Dortmund (Germany)
Academic and other job experience:
01.1996 - 04.1999	Research assistant, and since March 1997 Researcher, Center for Strategic Studies, Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Mexico
08.2001-12.2001	Research Fellow (Ph.D. scholarship), Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany
Since 01.2002	Research Associate, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany

Research:

Economic theory: Political economy, bounded rationality, social preferences
Econometrics: Random utility models, longitudinal data analysis, latent class models
Experimental economics: Bargaining, trust and reciprocity, auctions

Other:

Languages:

IT:

Refereed journal articles

When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons.Economics Letters, forthcoming (with Werner Güth and Vittoria Levati).
Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 20: 673-694 (with Susanne Büchner, Werner Güth and Vittoria Levati).
The investment game with asymmetric information. Metroeconomica, forthcoming (with Giorgio Coricelli and Amelie Mahlstedt ).

Other refereed publications

Firm specific investments based on trust and hiring competition: A theoretical and experimental study of firm loyalty. In: Franz, W., Ramser, H.J. and Stadler, M. (eds.) Schriftenreihe des Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Seminars Ottobeuren , Vol. 33, pp. 89-114, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004 (with Siegfried Berninghaus und Werner Güth).
The Economics of Corruption and Bureaucratic Inefficiency in Weak States: Theory and Evidence. Kollektive Entscheidungen, Wirtschaftspolitik und öffentliche Finanzen, Vol.12, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003 (monograph).

Working Papers:

Logit estimation of conditional cooperation in a repeated public goods experiment. Discussion Paper 05-2005 . Papers on Strategic Interaction. Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems. Jena, Germany, 2005. (with Graciela González-Farías and Vittoria Levati) Download PDF
A Note on Quantal Response Equilibria in Bargaining. Discussion Paper 01-2005 . Papers on Strategic Interaction. Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems. Jena, Germany, 2005. Download PDF
The Consistency Axiom: An Experimental Study. Discussion Paper 25-2004. Papers on Strategic Interaction. Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems. Jena, Germany, 2004. (with Werner Güth and Wiebke Kuklys) Download PDF
How Much to Pay in Cash? Employee Retention via Stock Options. Discussion Paper 24-2004. Papers on Strategic Interaction. Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems. Jena, Germany, 2004. (with Ruslan Gurtoviy) Download PDF
Speeding up Bureaucrats by Greasing Them: An Experimental Study. Discussion Paper 05-2002. Papers on Strategic Interaction. Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems. Jena, Germany, 2002. (with Werner Güth and Vittoria Levati) Download PDF

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Last Modification: 2009-10-02, 11:18Imprint

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